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Stanley Forman Reed:
Perspectives on a Judicial
Epitaph
By MORGAN D.S. PRIcKETT*
Death invites analysis. The departure of a Supreme Court Jus-
tice evokes an almost reflexive urge to evaluate his life and his
deeds. This process of assessment is often complicated by chronol-
ogy. But the passage of years does not guarantee perspective. Time
may either affirm or impeach earlier judgments. Subsequent exam-
ination can also obscure positions or characteristics that enjoyed
the contemporary appreciation of an earlier day. The mere passage
of time may bestow a prominence based solely on survival. Persons
of venerable years may be garlanded with attention because their
attention refracts the events and personages they have outlived.
Conversely, chronological attenuation from a moment of glory or
the source of power risks elevating antiquity above discernment.
The factor of time underscores the emphasis current scholar-
ship places on personality. Pundits commonly compartmentalize
and characterize the activities of the Supreme Court with reference
to the Chief Justice, although not every occupant of the center
chair dominates his colleagues. A Marshall or a Warren may be
offset by a Chase or a Vinson. Yet the habit, often artificial and
based more on convenience than on reality, persists, intermittently
displaced when attention is focused upon an Associate Justice who
may be flamboyant, exceptionally able, strong-willed, or strategi-
cally situated.1 Most Associate Justices are usually consigned to a
different fate:
* B.A., 1976; M.A., 1977, University of Southern California; J.D., 1980, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law, University of California. Member, California Bar.
1. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REv.
33 (1931); Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. CT. REv.
181; TnmE, Oct. 9, 1964, at 48 (cover story on Justice Black).
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AMONG THE MOST capricious of Clio's tricks is her ability to
obscure totally men who in their time managed to nudge the di-
rection of the course of events. Through misinterpretation or lack
of evidence or just simple neglect, an army of men lie interred in
the past, their lives forgotten, their impact on history unrecorded.
Perhaps most of them deserve a silent obscurity; but for others
this is not the case, as a study of their lives adds, at the least,
depth and texture to our understanding of their times.2
A case in point is Stanley Reed. When he died on April 3,
1980, the obituaries were perfunctory.' Yet his death is worthy of
notice because it was a sombre reminder that the era of the
Roosevelt Court had finally ended. The final survivor of FDR's
nine appointments,4 Stanley Reed came to the Court after serving
as Solicitor General for thirty-four tempestuous months. From
March 1935, to January 1938, Stanley Reed was the primary de-
fender of the New Deal before the jaundiced audience of the Nine
Old Men. The tide began to turn in 1937 when the retirement of
Justice Willis Van Devanter and his replacement by New Deal loy-
alist Senator Hugo H. Black broke the back of the conservative
opposition. In January 1938, another member of the obscurantist
forces, Justice George Sutherland, gave up the fight. It was al-
together fitting that Solicitor General Reed should succeed him. In
Professor Rodell's apt words, Reed's "thanks for his work before
the high bench was a seat behind it."5
2. Watts, William Moody, in 3 THE JuSTIcEs OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1801 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 23, col. 1.
4. In order of appointment they were:
1. Hugo L. Black was appointed in August 1937, retired in September 1971, and died in
September 1971.
2. Stanley Reed was appointed in January 1938, retired in February 1957, and died in
April 1980.
3. Felix Frankfurter was appointed in January 1939, retired in August 1962, and died in
February 1965.
4. William 0. Douglas was appointed in April 1939, retired in November 1975, and died in
January 1980.
5. Frank Murphy was appointed in January 1940, and died in July 1949.
6. Harlan F. Stone was promoted from Associate Justice to Chief Justice in June 1941, and
died in April 1946.
7. James F. Byrnes was appointed in June 1941, resigned in October 1942, and died in
April 1972.
8. Robert H. Jackson was appointed in June 1941, and died in October 1954.
9. Wiley B. Rutledge was appointed in January 1943, and died in September 1949.
5. F. RODELL, NirN MEN 267 (1955).
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Justice Reed stayed on the Court for nineteen years. During
this period, he participated in decisions dealing with war and
peace,' the nature and extent of presidential power,7 the anti-com-
munism of the Cold War era,8 the allocation of authority between
the states and the federal government,9 the abolition of de jure
segregation, 10 and the increasingly delicate and vital area of civil
liberties.1"
History has not been overly appreciative of Justice Reed's ef-
forts. The contemporary consensus during his tenure saddled him
with the image of an amiable but inert mediocrity.12 A recent sur-
vey by law professors and historians rated him as no more than an
"average" member of the Supreme Court in terms of his impact
and importance.13 He seems almost lost among the Justices with
6. E.g., Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341
(1952); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking &
Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Bowles v. Wil-
lingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phil-
lips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
7. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949); Propper v.
Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Steuart & Bros. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S.
371 (1940).
8. E.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
U.S. 442 (1954); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
9. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); United States v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Pat-
terson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
10. See note 93 infra.
11. See note 43 infra.
12. W. McCuNE, THE NINE YoUNG Mnb 267-68 (1947); F. RODELL, supra note 5, at
266; Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 78.
13. Blaustein & Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 1183, 1187
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whom he served who have attracted greater attention-Hughes,
Brandeis, Stone, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson and War-
ren-and who are esteemed as jurists of more considerable parts.
This focus is, in part, misplaced. It is no detraction from the
acclaim awarded the great and the near great to acknowledge that
these men achieved their fame by virtue of their membership in a
body whose importance, prestige and strength derives from its in-
stitutional identity. The Supreme Court is accorded an almost sac-
erdotal reverence because it alone of the three branches of govern-
ment is perceived as an entity divorced from party and parochial
concerns.14 The judiciary is the sole branch where alienation of
duty and personality is not only expected, it is demanded. The
American public retains a passionate attachment to Blackstone's
conception of judges as impersonal oracles of the law,15 despite the
fact that this theory has passed from favor among the legal cogno-
scenti.16 This popular image explains the public's impatience with
and incomprehension of disagreement on the Supreme Court.
Reverence is given the dissenter with the prophetic courage to
speak for the future,1 7 or when, in Cardozo's words, "he is the glad-
iator making a last stand against the lions." ' But the work of the
Court is accomplished as an institution. E Pluribus Unum is not
only the national motto, it is also the formula for the Court's suc-
cess. The predicate for the effective discharge of the Court's obli-
gations is the reasonable subordination of the individual impulse
to the institutional need for collective and concerted action. Stan-
ley Reed conducted his career conscious of and responsive to this
need. It is from this perspective that his life and work deserve to
be judged.
(1972).
14. L. LusKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 28 (1975).
15. Judges, said Blackstone, "are the depositaries [sic] of the laws; the living oracles,
who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to
the law of the land." W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. The connection between the Su-
preme Court and the Constitution was noted by another Briton, James Viscount Bryce, 150
years after Blackstone: "The Supreme Court is the living voice of the Constitution-that is,
of the will of the people expressed in the fundamental law they have enacted." 1 J. BRYCE,
THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 266 (1889).
16. E.g., T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42-43
(1956); G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, 196-99, 252, 371 (1976).
17. E.g., Beth, Justice Harlan and the Uses of Dissent, 49 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 1085
(1955).




Stanley Forman Reed was born on December 31, 1884, in east-
ern Kentucky. He received two Bachelor of Arts degrees, the first
from Kentucky Wesleyan in 1902, the second from Yale in 1906.
He began the study of law at the University of Virginia, but he
transferred after his first year to Columbia, from which he received
his LL.B in 1909. He completed his education with a year in Paris
at the Sorbonne.
Reed returned to the place of his birth and spent two years in
the general practice of law. He then devoted four years to active
politics as a member of the lower house of the Kentucky legisla-
ture, where he specialized in reforming labor conditions. After
chairing an organization working for Woodrow Wilson's re-election,
he returned to private practice in 1916.
Tobacco played an important role in the Kentucky economy;
it also was indirectly responsible for starting Reed on his path to
the Supreme Court. Lawyer Reed counseled a local tobacco cooper-
ative in marketing its crop surpluses. His expertise brought him to
the attention of the Republican administration, which in turn
brought Democrat Reed to Washington as General Counsel for the
Federal Farm Board in December 1929. Three years later, he as-
sumed the same position at the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, the Hoover agency set up to combat the effects of the Great
Depression. Retained by the incoming Roosevelt, Reed won the
New Deal's first important test before the Supreme Court when he
defended the Government's right and power to go off the gold
standard.19
Reed's success in The Gold Clause Cases20 led to his appoint-
ment as Solicitor General in 1935, just as the crest of the New
Deal's wave of innovative legislation reached the Court. As Solici-
tor General, Reed occupied a position of pivotal importance. He
defended measures deemed crucial by both the President and the
Congress to alleviate the unprecedented economic distress. In an
era when all we had to fear was fear itself, the maintenance of pub-
lic confidence in government was an imperative and abiding con-
cern. The appearance of action was almost as important as the re-
19. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317
(1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R, 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
20. Id.
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ality. But novel experiments found an unsympathetic reception
before a Supreme Court resolutely looking backwards to Thomas
Cooley and Herbert Spencer.
In short order, a majority of the Justices rejected Reed's argu-
ments on a variety of fronts. They overthrew laws looking to reha-
bilitate economic conditions in general21 as well as legislation
targetting particular sectors of the economy for reform.22 Congress
was denied power to regulate wages and prices in industries suffer-
ing acute economic dislocation.2 8 Even when the Court declined to
rule on constitutionality, it took a dim view of the administrative
machinery and procedures established to implement statutory
objectives.24 Reed's only notable victory in the area of economic
regulation prior to 1937 was the validation of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
2 5
The record was not entirely bleak. Solicitor General Reed par-
ticipated in several landmark decisions sustaining presidential au-
thority. In the area of foreign affairs, the Court laid down the
broad ukase that "the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation."2 The Court also ratified
presidential power to conclude executive agreements concerning
foreign affairs and granted the executive the sole authority to ac-
cord diplomatic recognition to foreign governments. However, the
Court balked at approving inherent executive license to remove
summarily and without cause a member of the Federal Trade
21. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
22. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933).
23. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See also Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 529 (1923). A like prohibition on setting minimum wages was laid upon the
states. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
24. See Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1 (1936)(agency denied power to compel witness to
produce business records). One expression of the Court's hostility to the burgeoning federal
bureaucracy of the New Deal was the rather short-lived doctrine that Congress could not
delegate its lawmaking functions to the President and/or agencies under his authority. See,
e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936).
25. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Reed also successfully defended the
Government's power to make grants for the creation of municipal power systems. See Duke
Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S.
464 (1938).
26. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
27. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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Commission.2"
But these victories were limited achievements in areas periph-
eral to the issue of burning concern-the restoration of economic
strength and stability. They could not offset the constricting if not
disabling effect of the Court's trend of decisions regarding govern-
mental power. For President Roosevelt, fresh from his electoral tri-
umph in the 1936 election, matters had reached an intolerable
state.
Once the President had decided to act, Solicitor General Reed
was one of the few members of the administration Roosevelt con-
sulted during the formulation of his plan to reorganize the Su-
preme Court.29 The reason for this selection was obvious: as Solici-
tor General, Reed had been the spokesman for the federal
government while it was subjected to the most intense and persis-
tent pummeling ever dealt out by the Supreme Court. The duality
of his position as both member of the administration and officer of
the Court forced Stanley Reed to walk a tightrope between per-
sonal belief and professional propriety. While he may have felt a
personal motivation to reverse the Court's direction, his profes-
sional loyalty to the institutional integrity of the Court denied
him-unlike others in the administrations°-the unseemly satisfac-
tion of publicly castigating the Court. Instead, and because intem-
perate attacks on basic institutions such as the Court were not in
28. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). This case is interesting
from several angles. It was the first argued by Reed as Solicitor General. Traditionally, the
maiden appearance is reserved for a case which presents an issue that is either simple and
well settled or of special interest to the new man. According to the general interpretation of
the most relevant precedent, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the President's
power of removal was thought clearly adequate to cover the case of Mr. Humphrey. That
the Supreme Court held otherwise caused considerable dismay at the White House, and, in
light of later events, may have had profound ramifications. This is Robert Jackson's evalua-
tion of the impact upon the President: "I really think the decision that made Roosevelt
madder at the Court than any other decision was that damn little case of Humphrey's Exec-
utor v. United States. The President thought they went out of their way to spite him per-
sonally and they were giving him a different kind of deal than they were giving Taft." E.
GERHART, AMFRIcA's ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 99 (1958) (footnote omitted).
29. W. SwINDLER, CouRT AND CoNsTmrrmoN IN THE TWENTmTH CENTURY: THE NEW
LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 58, 88 (1970). Accord, E. GERHART, supra note 28, at 107;
Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SuP. CT.
REV. 347, 382, 387. Contra, W. McCuNE, supra note 12, at 61. See generally L. BAKER, BACK
TO BACK (1967).
30. See, e.g., Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 1) 37-64
(1937)(remarks of Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson).
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his nature, Reed became the administration's link to the American
bar. He urged this audience to change basic attitudes regarding the
scope and allocation of governmental responsibilities under the
Constitution. Power had accumulated in Washington not by con-
spiratorial design but out of necessity, and the existing framework
of state-federal relations could contain its exercise.31 This change
could be accomplished if the Constitution was viewed as a flexible
document, one which was not synonymous with a static conception
of society.2
Whether the Court-packing plan frightened the Court into
submission remains an open question.8 3 Nevertheless, an incontro-
vertible and seismic change had occurred in the Court's posture,
and without a change in the Court's membership. The Court
crossed the Rubicon in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,M
when it upheld the Wagner Act 5 and the Government's power to
undertake the extensive task of modulating relations between labor
and management.36 Here was proof that the President may have
31. Reed, The State Today, 15 TENN. L. Rav. 52, 54, 69 (1937).
32. Reed articulated his concept of the organic Constitution in these words: "Its au-
thors intended it as a statement of principles upon which the Government should operate
into the indefinite future, not a code of laws written to meet the needs of an existing and
well understood condition.
"... [s]uccess would not have been achieved without an interpretation of our organic
law which treated its grants and limitations, as indicating the course of government, rather
than the boundaries of its powers.
... Regretfully but inevitably we must adjust our lives and our government to mod-
em needs and find, in a Constitution written for a simpler era, guidance for the problems of
our present age.
"The opportunity and the necessity for Government's service to its people cannot be
confined within rigid limits. The Constitution sets no such bounds. It is a living, vital insti-
tution whose function is to guide and not to curb necessary governmental processes. So to
construe and apply our organic law, to adapt its powers to the great ideal of social justice for
the governed, is truly to preserve, to protect and to defend the Constitution of our United
States." Reed, The Constitution of Our United States, 22 A.B.A.J. 601, 602, 608 (1936).
33. See, e.g., R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY 207-13 (1941). At-
tention has focused primarily upon Justice Roberts as the man whose "switch in time saved
nine," a charge the Justice's partisans have labored mightily to refute. 2 M. Pusny, CHARLES
EvANs HUGHES 757 (1951); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. Rnv. 311 (1955).
34. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 151-168 (1975 & Supp. 1980)).
36. Jones & Laughlin's acceptance of government sanction for collective bargaining
proceeded in part from a recent victory by Solicitor General Reed in Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), in which the Court upheld amendments to the
[Vol. 8:343
lost the battle but won the war. Stanley Reed played an important
and prominent role in the campaign.
The victory was consolidated when Hugo Black replaced Willis
Van Devanter in the summer of 1937. When George Suther-
land-the intellectual heartthrob of the Four Horsemen-retired
six months later, Reed's appointment seemed natural. The Presi-
dent installed a proven supporter of his programs and rewarded
the man who had defended the New Deal "with a patient passion
that had caused him once to faint in the course of argument."3
And the Court was augmented by a man whose training and tem-
perament for the Court, in contrast to Justice Black, were
unchallenged.39
II. On The Court
During the nineteen years he was on the Supreme Court,
Stanley Reed participated in thousands of cases in many areas and
at every level of decision. This article will not attempt to under-
take a comprehensive survey of this record in the hope of imposing
an articulate coherence. That task is better entrusted to more skill-
ful appraisers, whose analysis has already begun.4
0
Railway Labor Act requiring company negotiations with certified union representatives.
37. W. SWINDLER, supra note 29, at 133.
38. F. RODELL, supra note 5, at 252.
39. At the time of Reed's appointment, a minor controversy was raging about Justice
Black's fitness for the bench and the quality of his performance as a Justice. See A. MASON,
HARLAN FISrE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 467-76 (1956).
40. The best treatments of Justice Reed's career are by C. Herman Pritchett and in-
clude THE ROOSEvELT COURT. A STUDY IN JunicLL PoLrrcs AND VALUES 1937-1947
(1948)[hereinafter cited as PRrrCHETP, Roosevelt Court]; CIWL LMRTIES AND THE VINSON
COURT (1954)[hereinafter cited as PRITcHETr, Vinson Court], both of which are excellent
segmented studies of Reed's voting patterns; and THE POLmCAL OFFENDER AND THE WARREN
COURT (1958), which deals with Reed's final four years on the Court in a less exhaustive
manner than Pritchett's earlier works. Pritchett has also written the best overview of Reed's
entire career. Stanley Reed, in 3 THE JusTIcES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-
1969, at 2373-89 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1972). Although brief, this summary adroitly
uses broad strokes to sketch the large canvas of Justice Reed's entire judicial service.
Reed was on the Court when the construction of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment first came before the Court. His contributions in this area are delineated in F.
O'BRIEN, JusTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1958). The first half of Reed's tenure on
the Court was analyzed in a useful student note, Mr. Justice Reed-Swing Man or Not?, 1
STAN. L. REV. 714 (1949). The best overall study examining the work of the Court during
this general period is R. McCLosxEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (1972). Also helpful,
although less analytical stylistically is W. SWINDLER, supra note 29.
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In addition to being one vote among nine, a Justice may from
time to time assume a role within the Court that advances its suc-
cess and responsibilities. He may, for example, serve as a leader in
the formulation of substantive policy. Conversely, even when
others take the lead, the role of the follower of the strategic leader
is never unimportant; certainly it is mathematically important, be-
ing the role most frequently occupied by any member of the Court.
Lastly, a Justice may appoint himself the protector of the Court.
As an illustration, he may be the sentinel who sounds the tocsin
against a reappearance of the Court's besetting sin-the tendency
to overreach its power to the extent of suffering "self-inflicted
wounds." 4' The following cameos will demonstrate that Justice
Reed fulfilled each of these roles, always to the benefit of the
Court.
A. Leader
Stanley Reed does not have the reputation of a firebrand de-
fender of civil liberties. 42 Certainly he does not compare with a
Murphy or a Douglas in exhibiting a zealous militancy on behalf of
the individual. Although other members of the Court may have
been more supportive of claims against the state, it would be un-
fair and incorrect to characterize Justice Reed as a rubber stamp
for any and all governmental measures which impinged upon per-
sonal freedom.43
41. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrFD STATES 50 (1928). Chief Justice
Hughes' phrase referred to the extreme expression of public disaffection with one or more of
the Supreme Court's decisions. "Self-inflicted wounds" are primarily those missteps by the
Court that have necessitated the drastic extra-judicial remedy of constitutional amendment.
The term does not apply to the vast number of decisions thought to trespass beyond ab-
stract boundaries of doctrinal propriety or institutional responsibility.
42. E.g., R. McCLOSKPY, supra note 40, at 17, 63; PRTcHE-r, Roosevelt Court, supra
note 40, at 131, 162, 254-60; PnTCH-rr, Vinson Court, supra note 40, at 190-91, 227-29; F.
RODELL, supra note 5, at 314.
43. If anything, the cases where Justice Reed voted for the individual and against the
government read like a litany of the Bill of Rights. Here is a partial list: Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Cantwel v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304 (1946); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Beauhar-
[Vol. 8:343
One of the more popular recent innovations of the Supreme
Court has been the constitutional right of privacy."" Although Jus-
tice Reed was not on the Court when the privacy doctrine came
into its own, it is ironic that the man scorned as the insensitive
Elmer Fudd of the Roosevelt appointees45 played a dominant role
in the early privacy cases.
It was a long struggle, which began as part of the legal offen-
sive launched by the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940's. In 1943,
the Court divided five-to-four in a quartet of cases dealing with the
circumstances in which residential solicitation could be regulated
by government. Three of the cases46 involved municipal ordinances
which required door-to-door peddlers and canvassers to procure a
license from city authorities and to pay a license tax. The major
case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania,47 struck down these laws because
they could be used to tax the exercise of the Witnesses' constitu-
tional rights of free speech, press and religion. Such legislation was
voided because it threatened to become "a new device for the sup-
pression of religious minorities" 48 "as potent as the power of cen-
sorship. '49 Justice Reed dissented in these cases for himself and
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson, because he believed the
taxes to be within the traditional scope of governmental power.50
The fourth case, Martin v. Struthers,51 presented a qualita-
tively different problem. The city of Struthers, Ohio, had enacted
an ordinance which flatly prohibited
any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertise-
ments to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise
summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for
the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other adver-
tisements they or any person with them may be distributing.
52
Speaking for the majority, Justice Black found the law consti-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 277 (1952)(Reed, J., dissenting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
44. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 538 (1976); F. RODELL, supra note 5, at 266.
46. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), reversing 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
47. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
48. Id. at 115.
49. Id. at 113.
50. Id. at 133 (Reed, Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
51. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
52. Id. at 142.
Winter 1981] JUSTICE REED
354 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tutionally infirm because it presumed residents would be annoyed
by these activities. The city could not exercise this paternalistic
power consistent with the intent of the Framers of the First
Amendment, who anticipated that the communication of "novel
and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent."53 Peri-
odic summonses were often no more disruptive than numerous en-
vironmental factors, such as factories, which were accepted as a
matter of course. Justice Black believed the method chosen by the
city to protect against inconvenience was excessively overbroad,
given the threat of discouraging the practice of door-to-door can-
vassing then common in political campaigns: "The dangers of dis-
tribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods,
leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restric-
tion of the dissemination of ideas."" The recurring theme of the
majority opinion was that the First Amendment forbade any at-
tempt to substitute "the judgment of the community for the judg-
ment of the individual householder."
55
Justice Reed dissented for himself and Justices Roberts and
Jackson. His opinion disclosed the same underlying concept of or-
ganic constitutionalism he had espoused as Solicitor General.5
Justice Reed thought the ordinance valid because "[c]hanging con-
ditions have begotten modification by law of many practices once
deemed a part of the individual's liberty. ' 57 While the practice of
front porch solicitation had been tolerated if not welcomed by a
sparsely populated and largely rural society, it could become bur-
densome to a nation composed of millions of city dwellers. Noting
that Struthers was a community where many citizens worked at
night and slept during the day, Justice Reed looked past antiquity
and saw only a city council seeking to give its residents an "assur-
ance of privacy. '15 The Constitution defined the parameters of his
inquiry. While the majority focused on the potential for abuse,
Justice Reed confined himself to that instrument's language, whose
"limitations. . . are not maxims of social wisdom but definite con-
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id. at 147.
55. Id. at 144.
56. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.




trols on the legislative process. We are dealing with power, not its
abuse." 59 The city had foreclosed one mode of communication but
not all. It had struck the balance in favor of the privacy of its citi-
zens. Justice Reed did not think the First Amendment hobbled
governmental power to insure domestic tranquility. But the Court
did not yet agree.
Nor was it persuaded three years later when the controversy
shifted from the porch to the street. In Marsh v. Alabama,60 the
Court expanded the principle of Murdock to prevent company
towns from excluding Witnesses who proselytized on a sidewalk
that was technically private property.61 Since the corporate owner
had in effect dedicated the premises to public use, the Court held
that it could not reclaim its dominion over the property at will
when the property was used by members of the public in the exer-
cise of their constitutional rights. The central thesis of the opinion
mirrored that of Struthers-no one other than each member of the
intended audience could determine what could be communicated.
2
Dissenting for himself, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Bur-
ton, Justice Reed believed the Court was enforcing a priority
among rights, a hierarchy not established by the Constitution:
"The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well
as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of
the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or
free speech."63 As was the case in Struthers, the chilling effect on
speech was slight; the Witness could have moved thirty feet and
continued undisturbed. Justice Reed conceded the importance of
the right of free speech. But if the Court's decision compelled the
state to protect this right under compulsion of the First Amend-
ment, the ruling also disabled the Government's power to safe-
guard citizens from intrusions into their privacy. Henceforth, the
state "must commandeer, without compensation, the private prop-
erty of other citizens to carry out that obligation."
59. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. at 133 (1943)(Reed. J., dissenting).
60. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
61. Id. Accord, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
62. 326 U.S. at 509.
63. Id. at 516 (Reed, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 515. Reed characterized the decision as constitutionalizing the proposition
"that one may remain on private property against the will of the owner and contrary to the
law of the state so long as the only objection to his presence is that he is exercising an
asserted right to spread therehis religious views." Id. at 512.
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Saia v. New York 5 concerned a Jehovah's Witness who had
chosen to spread his message by sound truck in a public park with-
out a license. The five-man majority found the law under which he
had been convicted to be unconstitutional because it vested an offi-
cial with the unbridled discretion to grant or deny a permit. Jus-
tice Reed did not deliver a dissent of his own; instead he joined
Justice Frankfurter's opinion. Frankfurter's remarks generally
tracked his colleague's earlier objections. The law represented an
attempt not to ban speech but to minimize the inconveniences at-
tending its exercise. Justice Frankfurter also focused on the issue
of the state's power to reduce the "easy, too easy, opportunities for
aural aggression. . . . into cherished privacy. "66
The tide began to turn in 1949, one year following Saia. Ko-
vacs v. Cooper67 involved a municipal ordinance which denied the
use of the public streets to any vehicle employing amplifying de-
vices to emit "loud and raucous noises." While the Court at-
tempted to distinguish Saia, the similarity of the two statutes cast
Kovacs as a sub silentio overruling of the earlier decision.68 Chief
Justice Vinson not surprisingly selected the man who had been the
most persistent defender of privacy laws, Stanley Reed, to write
the first opinion upholding them.
Justice Reed zeroed in immediately on the core issue, the
power of government to enact such a law rather than its potential
abuses.6 9 He construed this aspect of state power broadly: "The
police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety,
65. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
66. Id. at 563 (Frankfurter, Reed & Burton, JJ., dissenting). "Surely there is not a
constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen. . . . And so I cannot agree that we
must deny the right of a State to control these broadcasting devices so as to safeguard the
rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise but to be free to put their freedom of
mind and attention to uses of their own choice." Id. at 563-64 (citation omitted). Justice
Jackson also dissented in a separate opinion.
67. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
68. This was the interpretation of three of the dissenters and at least one member of
the majority. Id. at 101-02 (Black, Douglas & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting); id. at 97-98 (Jack-
son, J., concurring). Justice Murphy dissented without opinion.
69. "The question is whether or not there is a real abridgment of the rights of free
speech." Id. at 85 (emphasis added). Accord, text at note 59 supra. Cf. United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882):
"Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful imagina-
tion in regard to almost every law upon which depends the rights of the individual or of the
Government, and if the existence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to withstand such
criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail." Id. at 217.
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and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to
protect the well-being and tranquility of a community. A state or
city may prohibit acts or things reasonably thought to bring evil or
harm to its people."7 0 This power had benign and beneficial uses.
It had been deployed on behalf of homeowners to protect and pre-
serve the privacy of those who could not protect themselves-not
to curtail freedom of expression. The individualized approach of
Struthers and Marsh would not function in situations where the
intrusion could not be turned away by a closed door. Justice Reed
perceived a new reality that differed from these prior cases: home-
owners had become a captive audience "at the mercy of advocates
of particular religious, social or political persuasions. 7 1 In this set-
ting, the city had to act or privacy would be imperiled.7 2 The ordi-
nance represented the accommodation struck by the city between
the rights of free speech and residential privacy. It was within the
scope of the government's power. Justice Reed was on the Supreme
Court to advance, not to frustrate, this commendable and constitu-
tionally permissable objective.
Kovacs was only a partial victory for Justice Reed. His opinion
articulated only the judgment of the Court, in a plurality rather
than a majority opinion. This deficiency was remedied in 1951,
when the capstone to this progression was laid. Reed's opinion in
Breard v. Alexandria7 3 was the opinion of the Court representing
the views of a solid six-man majority undiluted by concurrences.
The city of Alexandria, Louisiana, had made it a misdemeanor to
conduct unrequested solicitations for commercial reasons in and
upon private residences. Breard, a solicitor of magazine subscrip-
tions, appealed his conviction under this law on the grounds that it
violated the commerce clause, the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the free speech and press clauses of the
First Amendment.
Justice Reed's twenty-one page opinion sustaining the law was
a labor of love, perhaps the finest he ever wrote. It began with a
magisterial statement establishing the purpose of the inquiry and
70. 336 U.S. at 83 (footnote omitted). For recent statements in the same vein, see
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 59-60 (1973).
71. 336 U.S. at 87.
72. "In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference
with his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of the municipality." Id.
73. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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the problem in its resolution:
All declare for liberty and proceed to disagree among them-
selves as to its true meaning. There is equal unanimity that op-
portunists, for private gain, cannot be permitted to arm them-
selves with an acceptable principle, such as that of a right to
work, a privilege to engage in interstate commerce, or a free press,
and proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their path by
crushing the living rights of others to privacy and repose. This
case calls for an adjustment of constitutional rights in the light of
the particular living conditions of the time and place. Everyone
cannot have his own way and each must yield something to the
reasonable satisfaction of the needs of all.74
Breard's commerce and due process arguments were rejected,
but not before the Court in the process disclosed its deferential
attitude toward governmental actions taken under the necessity of
protecting privacy:
To the city council falls the duty of protecting its citizens
against the practices deemed subversive of privacy and of quiet. A
householder depends for protection on his city board rather than
churlishly guarding his entrances with orders forbidding the en-
trance of solicitors .... Changing living conditions or variations
in the experiences or habits of different communities may well
call for different legislative regulations as to methods and man-
ners of doing business. Powers of municipalities are subject to
control by the states. Their judgment of local needs is made from
a more intimate knowledge of local conditions than that of any
other legislative body.75
Concerning the First Amendment contentions, Justice Reed
reiterated his conception of an organic Constitution. Because the
Constitution has an evolutionary capacity to readjust to new and
old factors, no component, including the First Amendment, could
have an immutable meaning or effect. Each case turned on its own
merits, and the same facts could produce differing results accord-
ing to their factual settings. Therefore, Breard was not controlled
by Struthers, because the statute in Breard applied only to solici-
tations for commercial transactions78 and did not threaten religious
74. Id. at 625-26.
75. Id. at 640-41. The Cour's isolation from these conditions was discussed in Z.
CHAFEE, FIEE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 406 (1941).
76. At the time Breard was decided, the First Amendment did not protect commercial
speech. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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solicitations.77 Nor was Marsh dispositive, because Breard had not
trespassed upon land partaking of a public use by reason of a pri-
vate dedication.7
The equation not being foreclosed by these precedents, the
Court was free to accept the city's arguments that its law acted in
loco personam. Any other decision would "make a state or a city
impotent to guard its citizens against the annoyances of life. '7 9 On
consideration of all these facts, the Court felt "[i]t. . . would be a
misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free press to use
those guarantees to force a community to admit the solicitors of
publications to the home premises of its residents."80
At first blush, Justice Reed's intransigence in the early privacy
cases seems poorly calculated to serve the best interests of the
Court. After all, it only emphasized internal division, and this
weakens the Court. There were, however, several factors that justi-
fied Reed's perseverance. First, the issue was an important one and
almost certain to return to the Court. Second, the split in the
Court was a close one and likely to be of short duration, given a
change in personnel. Given the favorable prospects for a modifica-
tion of the Court's trend, Reed held his ground and refused to ac-
cede to the Struthers-Marsh philosophy. Gradually he built a con-
sensus around his position and saw it vindicated.81 The new
position represented a judicious compromise that preserved the es-
sence of both competing values. Reed's Breard opinion protected
the Court's interests in two ways. Strategically, it saved the Court
from becoming enmeshed in a guerrilla conflict with local authori-
ties and their constituents, a clash that would probably have inten-
sified with time and urbanization. Tactically, the Court accom-
plished the shift without overtly displacing recent precedents,
something that seldom benefits the Court's public and professional
77. 341 U.S. at 642-43.
78. Id. at 643.
79. Id. at 632.
80. Id. at 645.
81. Reed followed this practice unremittingly no matter how seductive the side-issues.
For example, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), he clung tenaciously to the issue
presented and went no further. While Justices Black and Frankfurter debated the nature of
due process and began their duel over incorporation of the Bill of Rights, Justice Reed
labored to preserve a majority decision as to whether the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination was compatible with a California statute permitting a prosecutor
to comment on an accused's silence at trial.
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standing.8 2
B. Follower
The essence of the judicial function is choice.8" Every member
of the Supreme Court is continually confronted with the necessity
of choosing between principles. Initially, he must choose between
the principles proffered by competing litigants. Except in those in-
creasingly infrequent instances where the Court is unanimous, he
must then choose among the variegated panoply of principles gov-
erning the disposition and presentation once a decision as to the
merits has been reached. At both of these stages, the personal im-
pulse to preserve and record an individual position must be bal-
anced against the diminution that attaches to a decision the fur-
ther it recedes from unanimity, for it is an unhappy fact that a
decision is more often judged by arithmetical rather than logical
criteria.
When a Justice finds himself at odds with his brothers, the
antinomies of tenacity and submission are activated. Fundamental
convictions are not and should not be yielded lightly. The Court is
the palladium of unorthodoxy, especially within itself. Its menibers
have often stressed the institutional benefits that accrue to princi-
pled dissent.8' But the demands of conscience are subjective unto
the holder. They may be offset and overborne. The democratic
principle that the validity of a policy is measured by the level of
support it commands extends to the conference room. Submission
to the collective opinion of colleagues is a homeostatic canon that
benefits the Court, its reputation, and its effectiveness. It cannot
be otherwise, lest an institution atomize into the unconnected and
ineffectual fragments of its membership. At some point, the de-
scent into anarchy must be arrested. Every member of the Court
struggles to discover the harmonious median between the Scylla of
pointless obstinacy and the Charybdis of needlessly sacrificing
deeply-held beliefs. The line of demarcation is seldom clear and
82. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211,
215-19. Accord, C. HUGHES, supra note 41, at 52.
83. See generally B. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
84. C. HUGHES, supra note 41, at 67-68; Beth, supra note 17, at 1086; Jackson, Advo-
cacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentation, 37 A.B.A.J.
801, 863 (1951). Contra, Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400
(1904)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 8:343
often treacherous. The mental calculus is rarely static, even in or-
dinary cases. When the case is a "great" one and when one judge
resists all his colleagues, the pressures for conformity are enor-
mous. A Justice's response in such a situation is quite often the
measure of the man.
By any standard, Brown v. Board of Education" was a great
case. It took three years to reach the Supreme Court, where its
manifold implications and importance caused it to be held over
and reargued, so uneasy were the Justices over the fateful step
they were about to take. A preliminary vote showed a bare major-
ity in favor of overruling Plessy v. Ferguson"8 and its doctrine of
"separate but equal" in public education. At this point, several
Justices, Reed among them,87 were reluctant to undertake this mo-
mentous course. Their threat to dissent was not an empty one.
The looming split galvanized the energies of the newly-ap-
pointed Chief Justice Earl Warren, who meant to have the Court
united and unanimous when it declared that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."8 8 His
labors to this end, and his ultimate success have been fully and
movingly recounted. 9 One by one, the putative dissenters yielded
to the array of arguments deployed by the Chief Justice. The last
to capitulate was Stanley Reed.
The role of the sole dissenter was not unknown to Justice
Reed,90 but it was uncomfortable. Agonizing over his increasing
isolation, he instructed his clerks to marshall every possible sup-
port for his stand.9 1 The pressure for conformity mounted. Eventu-
ally, unanimity was achieved. Fully aware that he was participating
in a death-blow to much of the culture that had nurtured him, Jus-
tice Reed submitted to the needs of the Court. He knew, as did his
colleagues, that a premium attaches to a unanimous decision. For a
case as important as Brown, the entire Court was painfully aware
that opponents of the decision would seize upon the slightest hint
of a break in the Court's monolithic front to justify and foment
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87. R. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 595-96, 680.
88. 347 U.S. at 495.
89. R. KLUGER, supra note 45.
90. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Reed, J., dissent-
ing); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943)(Reed, J., dissenting).
91. R. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 655-56, 691-93.
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resistance. Every member of the Court knew that the silence pro-
duced by Reed's acquiescence was the sound of a moral and psy-
chological weight shifting on its fulcrum and that the Court would
be the beneficiary.
"For the good of the country, he put aside his own basis for
dissent.""2 This was the eloquent observation of one of Justice
Reed's clerks. It summarized Reed's evolution and the dilemma of
a Justice in similar situations. Here a deeply held belief had sur-
rendered to the demands for unity. But his acquiescence was a
principled submission made not for base reasons of insecurity or
bigotry,9 3 but for the collective good of the Court and the nation.
C. Protector
Because the Supreme Court is the source of each Justice's au-
thority, every member of the Court has a vested interest in pre-
serving its strength and reputation. This imperative does not mean
he must tamely and invariably submit to either precedent or a ma-
jority of his colleagues. To the contrary, the Court's history is re-
plete with instances where one or more Justices have disproven the
judicial equivalent of the maxim vox populi, vox dei.94 Although
dissent is the most common mode of expression for this impulse, a
Justice who concurs as to ends but differs only as to means can use
his greater area of agreement with the majority as leverage to per-
suade them to modify their collective posture.
Qualified acquiescence may only compound the confusion and
further debase the currency of judicial decision. Justice Reed's sen-
92. Id. at 698.
93. Such a charge cannot be leveled against Justice Reed, who had joined the Court's
demarch6 against segregation in public education, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), systematic exclusion
of blacks from jury service, Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), from the political process, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), or
discrimination in the incidents of interstate commerce, Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Bob-
Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville &
N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
94. "The voice of the people is the voice of God."
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sitivity to the Court's institutional needs made him chary of such
efforts. While on the Court, Reed wrote only 20 concurrences, less
than 6% of the 339 opinions he authored. So the occasions when
he publicly declared himself to be with the majority but not of
them were reserved for the extraordinary case. The decision Jus-
tice Harlan F. Stone deemed "the most important opinion' dur-
ing his tenure provided such an occasion. The case was all the
more remarkable because it arose only two weeks after Solicitor
General Reed was sworn in as Mr. Justice Reed.
When the Erie Railroad Company asked the Supreme Court
to review the favorable judgment secured by Harry Tompkins after
he brought an action for negligence, it furnished the opportunity
for Justice Brandeis to dismantle one of the most venerable but
hotly disputed monuments of federal practice. The result of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" was that henceforth "in all matters ex-
cept those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as
well as written. ' 7 The Court thus overruled Swift v. Tyson,98
which had held that the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789" did not
encompass the decisions of state courts within the state "laws"
which federal courts were bound to apply.100
The ground for the decision rather than the result is impor-
tant here. Justice Brandeis could have decided the case on any of
three possible grounds: (1) that Swift v. Tyson misconstrued the
Judiciary Act, (2) that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in
attempting to specify the substantive law applicable in federal
courts, or (3) that the Court had acted unconstitutionally in ignor-
ing the legitimate scope of state power. Justice Brandeis elimi-
nated the second alternative,101 leaving only the first and third
courses. Put to a decision, Justice Brandeis chose the third, placing
95. A. MASON, supra note 39, at 476. Justice Black was even more expansive, terming
it "one of the most important cases at law in American legal history." Black, Address, 13
Mo. B.J. 173, 174 (1942).
96. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97. Id. at 72-73.
98. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
99. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1977)).
100. The background, subsequent evolution, and difficulties of Erie are ably discussed
in C. WRIoHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF FEDIAL CounTS 249-86 (3d ed. 1976).
101. 304 U.S. at 79-80.
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the onus squarely on the Court.10 2 Justice Brandeis condemned al-
most one hundred years of decisions as a course of conduct
founded upon "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
courts of the United States.' "Las
Justice Reed agreed that Swift v. Tyson deserved to be over-
ruled, but he differed with the manner adopted by the majority to
achieve this result. Merely announcing a new interpretation of the
Judiciary Act would have been sufficient for him. This could have
been done by admitting that the rule of Swift, whatever its ab-
stract merit, had proved unworkable and therefore should be set
aside. Alternatively, the Court could have proclaimed that it had
belatedly discovered the "correct" construction of the Act origi-
nally intended by Congress. Whatever the rationale of statutory
construction selected, Justice Reed thought it "unnecessary to go
further and declare that the 'course pursued' was 'unconstitu-
tional,' instead of merely erroneous."'0
Although Justice Reed was much too polite to blazon it forth
in the United States Reports, he had caught Justice Brandeis vio-
lating the most important of the Court's unofficial canons for
avoiding constitutional issues, namely, that the currency of judicial
and constitutional authority will be precisely calibrated to the
minimum necessary for deciding a case. Justice Brandeis himself
had given the rule its most famous expression only two years
before he wrote the Erie opinion:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
102. "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be pre-
pared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the uncon-
stitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so." Id.
at 77-78.
"Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, 'an unconstitu-
tional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or re-
spectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.' In disapproving that doctrine
we... merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States."
Id. at 79-80 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
103. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
104. 304 U.S. at 91 (Reed, J., concurring). This concern was not a transitory impulse.
See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946)(Frankfurter & Reed, JJ.,
concurring).
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has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.105
Erie presented the ironic spectacle of the most junior member
of the Court reminding one of the most senior of his obligations to
the Court. What was remarkable was the speed with which Justice
Reed shed the perspective of an advocate and adopted that of a
judge. Fresh from the trauma of the Court-packing debacle, this
New Deal appointee was urging the Court to avoid the damage
that would follow a self-flagellating admission that it had breached
its responsibilities by pursuing an unconstitutional course of con-
duct for a century. Whatever the sincerity or accuracy of this pub-
lic mea culpa, such a confession would only diminish public confi-
dence, taint the Court's decisions during its "unconstitutional"
period, and needlessly jeopardize the Court's future authority and
effectiveness. The tenor of Justice Reed's Erie opinion reflected
the perspective of one sensitive to, and cognizant of, the institu-
tional needs and traditions of the Court.106
III. Off The Court
Scant attention was paid to Stanley Reed's retirement from
the Supreme Court on February 25, 1957.107 Most commentators
focused on the field of likely successors and their respective philo-
sophical orientations.108 One person who did take notice was Presi-
dent Eisenhower, who offered to name Reed chairman of the Civil
Rights Commission. Justice Reed declined because he had retained
his judicial commission and the possible appearance of a conflict of
interests between the two positions might, in his words, "lower re-
105. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring)(emphasis
added). Justice Reed had particular reason to recall this decision. See text accompanying
note 25 supra.
106. As a postscript, Justice Reed subsequently became one of the Court's leading
authorities on the Erie doctrine. See generally Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Vandenbark v. Owen-Illinois
Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
107. A notable exception was the sympathetic and perceptive column by Reed's long-
time friend Arthur Krock. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1957, § B, at 3, col. 1.
108. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1957, § L, at 12, col. 5. This situation replicated that of
Justice Sherman Minton, who had retired from the Court five months before Reed, correctly
prophesizing "There will be more interest in who will succeed me than in my passing."
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1956, at 38.
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spect for the impartiality of the Federal judiciary." 109 His caution
was well founded, because he did continue his judicial service.
Eventually, he heard more than sixty cases over the next decade
while on temporary assignments to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and the Court of Claims. Where there could
be no hint of conflicting loyalties, such as with the Import-Export
Bank and the Federal Board of Hospitalization, he was glad to
serve.
During the twenty-three remaining years of his life, Justice
Reed was a model of decorum. Unlike others retired from the
Court, he refrained from attacks upon the Court, its work, or his
former colleagues.11 0 Nor did he attempt to influence them from
the sidelines.""' After his increasingly frail health ended his peri-
odic stints in the lower courts, he and his wife moved to Hunting-
ton, New York, to be closer to his two attorney sons and their fam-
ilies. He died there on April 3, 1980.
IV. Judgment
The public prominence achieved by a Justice during his life-
time may be a deceptive indicator of his importance within the
Court. 1 2 So it is with Stanley Reed. Lacking the restless curiosity
109. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 23, col. 1. This attention to the judicial proprie-
ties was the product of several episodes touching Justice Reed's experiences when he
stepped outside the judicial arena. Soon after he was appointed to the Court, Reed chaired a
commission charged with the responsibility for making recommendations for civil service
reform. The presence of Justices Frankfurter and Murphy preserved the appearance of rec-
titude. But it was after this service was completed and the final report submitted, see RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDEN'S CoMmrrrn ON CIvuL SERVICE IMPROVE MENT, H.R. Doc. No. 118,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), that Justice Reed modified his willingness to undertake non-
judicial duties. This was partly the result of his being exposed to the well-publicized hostil-
ity of Chief Justice Stone to such extra-judicial assignments; A. MASON, supra note 39, at
705-15, 719-20; and partly to the controversy surrounding Justice Jackson's service as Chief
United States Prosecutor at the Nuremburg war crimes trial. The change was apparent
when Reed had to be subpoenaed to testify for Alger Hiss when his former subordinate was
tried for perjury. Unlike some of his colleagues, Reed was scrupulous in avoiding personal
contact with President Roosevelt once he was on the Court. W. SWINDLER, supra note 29, at
97.
110. Such attacks have run the gamut from the direct, Brynes, The Supreme Court
Must be Curbed, U.S. News & World Report, May 18, 1956, at 50, and Whittaker, A Confu-
sion of Tongues, 51 A.B.A.J. 27 (1965), to the oblique, 0. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 95 (1951).
111. Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1965).
112. Justice Van Devanter, who was esteemed within the Court and virtually unknown
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of Felix Frankfurter, the epigrammatic brilliance of Robert Jack-
son, or the inspired dogmatism of Hugo Black, he cast no giant
shadow while alive. He does not loom large in retrospect and in
death he seems fated to be studied only with reference to the
larger personality and doctrinal conflicts on the Court. His proba-
ble fate is to be regarded as a mediocre cipher, interesting only as a
pawn in the numbers game that constitutes much of the modern
scholarship about the Court. Nevertheless, his service was useful in
its time, and it retains an exemplary relevance.
Justice Reed's method of judging followed what Justice Frank-
furter termed the empiric process.113 He approached and decided
each case according to its merits, without attempting to fit it
within a pigeonhole of preconceived predilection. Because circum-
stances and consequences were weighty considerations, his re-
sponses were not predictable and he was never an automatic mem-
ber of any bloc within the Court.
114
These were his means. The ends to which they were devoted
were a function of his time. If Justice Reed left the Court as he
joined it, a "confirmed believer in government power when wielded
discerningly in the public interest," 5 this was because during his
formative years government was an undisputed force for good.
This orientation was particularly evident when, as in the privacy
versus free speech dilemma, the benevolent use of government
power could be reconciled with claims of individual liberty. Reed's
typology of judging involved primarily synthesizing conflicting val-
ues in particular cases, finding the optimal combination of values
outside it, serves as an example. A. MASON, WiLIAM HOWARD TAFT. CHIEF JUSTICE 221
(1965); Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 889 (1953). Justice
Douglas may be proof of the converse of this proposition.
113. "[Jludicial judgment is involved in an empiric process in the sense that results
are not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable. But that is a very different thing from
conceiving the results as ad hoc decisions in the opprobrious sense of ad hoc. Empiricism
implies judgment upon variant situations by the wisdom of experience. Ad hocness in adju-
dication means treating a particular case by itself and not in relation to the meaning of a
course of decisions and the guides they serve for the future. There is all the difference in the
world between disposing of a case as though it were a discrete instance and recognizing it as
part of the process of judgment, taking its place in relation to what went before and further
cutting a channel for what is to come." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954)(Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
114. W. McCuNE, supra note 12, at 62. Accord, J. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 268
(1968).
115. R. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 211. See also id. at 242 for a similar if more em-
phatic statement of Justice Reed's attitude towards government.
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in a given situation.
His talent for harmonization derived from a philosophical atti-
tude that encompassed both the Constitution and the society it
served. Like Edmund Burke, Reed found latent wisdom in the
mere existence of time-honored practices and institutions. His ju-
ristic method included an element of social Darwinism by assum-
ing that the tried and the true have a prescriptive right to contin-
ued allegiance. His view of the Constitution as an organic
instrument centered on the fact that it does not condemn measures
taken for reasons of expediency when combined with equity and
utility. The flexibility of the Constitution implicitly recognizes ex-
perience as the engine for change and the guide for stable con-
tinuity. Expansion and contraction, experiment and conservation,
boldness and prudence are the essence of governance. The demo-
cratic method of resolving problems is itself organic: the political
branches operate as a computing principle to continually reassess
and reset the equilibrium between the needs and demands of soci-
ety. Justice Reed felt that legislative attempts to cope must be tol-
erated if not fostered by the judiciary unless a specific provision of
the Constitution precluded passivity.
Within this framework, the personality of the man impacted
on the performance of the judge. Unfailingly polite,116 Reed was
free from any tincture of self-importance or intellectual arro-
gance. 1 7 His personal modesty became a professional asset, per-
mitting him to recognize and adopt the perspective of what best
promoted the needs of the Court. His personality aided the unity
that sustains the Court on two levels. When unanimity was advan-
tageous for the Court, as it was in Brown, Reed's vanity was not an
impediment to the advancement of the institutional good. This was
a steadying force on a Court so divided into tesselated splinterings
116. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 303-04 (1974); J. FRANK, THE MAR-
BLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 257 (1958); R. KLUGER, supra note 45,
at 595, 698; W. SWINDLER, supra note 29, at 133.
117. These were traits particularly appreciated by his colleagues; W. DOUGLAS, supra
note 116, at 458-59; A. MASON, supra note 39, at 472, 476; E. GERHART, supra note 28, at 85,
133; although some of his Brothers may have tried to take advantage of Reed's non-assertive
character. Id. at 274 ("Reed is said to be easily influenced and Black terrorizes Reed when-
ever he can."); R. KLUGER, supra note 45, at 585 ("Frankfurter ... used [Reed] as an intel-
lectual punching bag. . . ."). Accord, W. DOUGLAS, supra note 116, at 459. Nevertheless, the
Frankfurter diaries give hints that Reed had a strong ego and a critical perception of his
colleague's flaws. J. LASH, FROM THE DiAtos OF FELix FRANKFURTER 181-82, 205, 270, 286-87
(1975).
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and so riven with disagreement that it has come to be known as
the Court of the "Wild Horses." 118 On a more prosaic level, he held
himself aloof from inflamed tempers and personal disputes
within119 and without 20 the Court, refraining from the exchange of
reciprocal billingsgate. Despite these distractions, Justice Reed
laboured on, a paragon of dutiful service and "one of the work-
horses of the Court.'
21
The Supreme Court works a kind of alchemy. There, small
men have become great and great men have become giants. The
Court can magnify strengths and weaknesses in a Justice's charac-
ter, yet it rarely creates them. Stanley Reed did not set out to gain
a place on the Supreme Court. He achieved that position by doing
well and being content to do his best in whatever position he occu-
pied. The colleagues of Mr. Justice Stanley Reed offered a fitting
tribute upon his retirement. They saluted his dedicating "twenty-
eight of the best years of [his] life to the nation. More could not be
asked of anyone. 1 2 2 They were good years and his was a good and
productive life.
118. P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 221 (1969); A. MASON, supra note 39,
at 574. The term was coined by Chief Justice Stone. Id. at 580.
119. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 672 (1944)(Black, J.,
concurring); A. MASON, supra note 39, at 765-69 (dispute involving letter of farewell to Jus-
tice Roberts).
120. E. GERHART, supra note 28, at 235-77 (allegation of misconduct by Justice Black
from Justice Jackson).
121. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 205 (1974).
122. 352 U.S. xiv (1957).
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